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not to say that all discretion should be removed from the trial court in granting
or denying continuances ;s9 but certainly where it is clear from the record that
an attorney could not possibly had performed properly in the amount of time
allowed, there is no justification of indulging in presumptions which serve no
fuction other than to effectively deny an important constitutional right."
The character and extent of the administrative defects just discussed
indicate a serious lack of perspective on the part of the Indiana Supreme
Court in regard to its duty to safeguard constitutional rights. If the Indiana
right to counsel is to maintain its deserved status, it is essential that the
court adopt measures of enforcement which will substantially guarantee the
necessary protection.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
Lawrence Cook was convicted of murder on July 23, 1931, sentenced to
life imprisonment, and removed to the Indiana State Prison on the following
day. Under existing law he had six months to perfect an appeal to the
Indiana Supreme Court. Within this period Cook, with the aid of other
prisoners, prepared the necessary appeal papers and attempted to send them
to the circuit court in which he was convicted. His efforts were thwarted
by prison authorities in pursuance of a prison regulation against sending
out legal papers.
On March 11, 1949, having run the perplexing gamut of state remedies
and after more than seventeen and one-half years of incarceration, Cook was
discharged from custody. The Federal District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Indian'a granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered
his unconditional release on the ground that the suppression of his appeal
documents had denied him the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This decision
was affrimed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.'
Justice Black, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, vacated the
judgments of the two lower courts. While accepting Cook's contention that
he had been denied equal protection of the laws, the Court thought that an
actual appellate determination of the merits of his conviction would cure this
considered by any lawyer in fifteen minutes." Emmert, C.J., dissenting in Schmittler v.
State, 93 N.E.2d 184, 192, 195 (Ind. 1950).
89. Delays because of newly discovered evidence or other emergency should be
discretionary with the trial judge and reviewed only for abuse of discretion.
90. See 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118 (1950).
1. United States ex rel. Cook v. Dowd, Warden, 180 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1950).
NOTES
defect. Upon remand, the Disfrict Court was instructed to allow the state of
Indiana a reasonable time to afford an adequate review. Only in the event of
Indiana's failure to do so is he to receive an unconditional discharge.2
The sequence of events culminating, in 1951, in the above disposition of
Cook's bid for freedom was remarkably protracted and therefore worthy of
note.3 In 1937, he filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the cir-
cuit court in which he was convicted. In the course of the coram nobis pro-
ceedings, 4 which dragged on until 1944, three special judges presided and
the matter reached the Indiana Supreme Court twice,5 with no change in
petitioner's status resulting.
2. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 71 Sup. Ct. 262 (U.S. 1951).
3. It should not be inferred that Indiana is the only state in which the exhaustion of
state remedies is a long and needlessly technical ordeal. In the well known Nebraska
Hawk cases petitioner has pursued his freedom through nineteen hearings without success.
FRANK, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 765 (1950). For a partial description of these
proceedings see Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
4. Writ of error coram nobis will lie in Indiana where some fact exists "which was
not in issue at the trial and which demonstrates that the trial court judgment was incorrect
on the merits. George v. State, 211 Ind. 429, 6 N.E.2d 336 (1936). IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-3301 (Burns Repl. 1946). No court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for coram
nobis where petitioner alleges matters which were or could have been adjudicated in prior
coram nobis proceedings. IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-3302 (Burns Repl. 1946). Where new
facts appear, petitioner must, in the absence of unusual circumstances, exhaust his state
remedy of coram nobis before he may resort to habeas corpus in the federal district
court. Jones v. Dowd, 128 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Ex parte Botwinsky, 314 U.S. 586
(1942). This remedy has not been exhausted until its denial has been appealed to the
state supreme court and a petition for writ of certiorari has been filed with the United
States Supreme Court and denied. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950) ; -,EX parte
Davis, 318 U.S. 412 (1943). But cf. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
In the district court's memorandum opinion dismissing Cook's first petition for.habeas
corpus, the court said: "Another ground urged by respondent for dismissal of the peti-
tion is that the petitioner has not yet exhausted his state court remedies, and that therefore,
this court lacks jurisdiction. Inasmuch as the petitioner has been denied the right to
prosecute his appeal pursuant to the pronouncement by the Indiana Supreme Court in
the habeas corpus action initiated in LaPorte County; and further, since he has failed in
his efforts to have that denial reviewed on certiorari by the-United States Supreme Court,
it would appear that he has met the test laid down in Ex parte Hawke, 321 U.S. 114
(1944), for bringing a petition of habeas corpus in the federal court." Since petitioner
in the Cook case pursued the remedy of coram nobis in the ciicuit court but failed to appeal
the final decision of that court to the Indiana Supreme Court, the District Court's opinion
leaves to speculation the reason why peiitioner was not required to completely exhaust
that -remedy. (The court quite possibly considered the frustrating and confusing legal
knot in which these proceedings had ended. See note 5 infra.)
Prior to State ex rel. McManamom v. Blackford Circuit Court 95 N.E.2d 556 (1950),
coram nobis was apparently available only within five years from the date of conviction
unless recourse to this remedy was prevented by state action or insanity. IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-3301 (Burns Repl. 1946). This statute was declared unconstitutional by the above case.
5. In the first case the petitioner appealed from the denial of a motion for a nunc
protunc entry sought to reinstate an order in a coram nobis proceeding granting a new
trial after that order had been withdrawn by the trial court. Cook v. State of Indiana,
219 Ind. 234, 37 N.E.2d 63 (1941).
Later the petitioner sought from the Indiana Supreme Court a mandamus to the trial
court to try the issues presented by the coram nobis petition. Grounds stated were that the
trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it allowed the state's answer to be withdrawn
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
In 1945, Cook petitioned the Jennings County Circuit Court for a writ of
habeas corpus.6 The denial of this petition was affirmed by the Indiana
Supreme Court,7 and certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was
denied.' In its opinion affirming the refusal of the writ by the circuit court
the Supreme Court of Indiana indicated that the denial of petitioner's right to
appeal did not nullify the judgment against him and intimated that his
proper remedy was to petition that court for a delayed appeal.9 Following
this suggestion, Cook petitioned for permission to perfect a delayed appeal
on September 4, 1946. His affidavits were considered together with those
filed by the State attorney general and one by the defense attorney. The lat-
ter's affidavit stipulated that his failure to appeal the case was not influenced
by Cook's impecunious condition. The petition was denied."0  Once again
and by sustaining the latter's demurrer. The court stated that where the trial court hasjurisdiction of the person and subject matter, the correct remedy for improperly per-
mitting or sustaining a demurrer is by appeal. State ex rel Cook v. Wickens, 222 Ind.
383, 53 N.E.2d 630 (1944).
6. Tw6 months later Cook filed a similar petition in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana. This also was denied.
. In Indiana a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may not be filed in any court other
than the one in which the petitioner was convicted. IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-1918 (Bums
Repl. 1946) ; State er rel. Barnes v. Howard, 224 Ind. 107, 65 N.E.2d 55 (1945) ; State ex
rel. Cook v. Howard, 223 Ind. 694, 64 N.E.2d 25 (1945) ; State ex rel. Kinkel v. LaPorte
Circuit Court, 209 Ind. 682, 200 N.E.2d 614 (1935). A later statute has been construed
to require also that only the courts of the county of incarceration have jurisdiction to
entertain the petition. IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-1905 (Burns Repl. 1946) ; State ex rel. Moore
v. Carlin, 226 Ind. 437, 81 N.E.2d 670 (1948). Thus habeas corpus is available in
Indiana only to those who are incarcerated in the county where they were convicted.
This situation has been recognized by the Seventh Circuit which has upheld the decisions
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana finding that
state remedies had been exhausted where there had been no resort to habeas corpus.
Williams v. Dowd, 153 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1946); Potter v. Dowd, 146 F.2d 244 (7th Cir.
1944). These statutes, as they have been interpreted, appear not only to directly contra-
vene ART. 1, § 25 of the INDIANA CONSTITUTION, which prohibits the suspension of the
writ, but also to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since
only those petitioners who were convicted in LaPorte county and are incarcerated there
in the Indiana State Prison can avail themselves of the writ under the now existing law.
The inadequacy of habeas corpus in Indiana has resulted in an enlargement of the
scope of coram nobis. This. development has deemphasized the defects of the habeas
corpus statutes by decreasing the necessity of resorting to that remedy.
For a preceding discussion of exhaustion of state remedies in Indiana, see Note, 22
IND. L.J. 189 (1947).
7. State ex rel. Cook v. Howard, 223 Ind. 694, 64 N.E.2d 25 (1945).
8. Cook v. Howard, 327 U.S. 808 (1946).
9. "If appellant has been denied the privilege of appealing his case, by the warden
and employees of the prison where he is serving, until the time allowed by statute for an
appeal has expired, that fact would not nullify the judgment lawfully rendered against
him by the Jennings Circuit Court. It would merely extend the time for appeal during
the period of such disability." State ex rel. Cook v. Howard, 223 Ind. 694, 699, 64 N.E2d
25, 27 (1945).
10. It appears that the Indiana Supreme Court failed to squarely meet petitioner's
principal contention in this application. Whereas he relied on the allegation that his consti-
tutional rights were violated by the action of state authorities who suppressed his appeal
documents, the court turned down his application with the observation that there was
no irregularity in the failure of his trial counsel to prosecute the appeal.
NOTES
Cook sought certiorari to the United States Supreme Court without avail.:1 A
petition for rehearing, which reemphasized the fact that his right to appeal
had been defeated by prison authorities, was likewise denied.' 2
On November 13, 1947, Cook filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. 3
The State's motion to dismiss was granted on June 24 of the following year.' 4
Allowance of an amended petition followed"5 and this time respondent's motion
to dismiss was denied. On February 17, 1949, a hearing was held, and the
District Court's decision, rendered on February 28, ordered petitioner's
discharge from custody. 6 When confronted with the amended petition, the
District Court decided that its objection to Cook's prior petition-his failure
to demonstrate the probability of prosecuting a successful appeal-was not a
valid consideration in determining whether the petition should be granted.
On February 7, 1950, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision.'7  In
its opinion the court traced in detail the state remedies petitioner had pursued
in his effort to secure recognition of his constitutional rights. Denial by the
Indiana Supreme Court of the petition for a delayed appeal was emphasized.
If this can be construed as a recognition by the Seventh Circuit that the
delayed appeal is an available remedy in Indiana when state action has de-
feated a petitioner's attempts to secure timely review, it seems highly probable
that such an appeal will hereafter be considered as an "established" state
remedy under these circumstances.' 8
Thus, as a precautionary measure the petitioner who has been denied the
right to appeal by action of state officers in Indiana, in contravention of the
equal protection clause, must go through an additional step before seeking
his discharge on writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. Failure to
proceed in this manner will subject him to the risk of being denied relief on
11. Cook v. Indiana, 330 U.S. 841 (1947).
12. Cook v. Indiana, 331 U.S. 863 (1947).
13. Transcript of Record, pp. 4, 5, 6, and 7, United States ex rel. Cook -v. Dowd,
Warden, 180 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1950).
14. Transcript of Record, pp. 10 and 11, United States ex rel. Cook v. Dowd,
Warden, 180 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1950).
15. Transcript of Record, p. 18, United States ex rel. Cook v. Dowd, Warden, 180
F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1950).
16. The court delayed entry of the formal order of discharge until March 10, 1949.
17. United States ex rel. Cook v. Dowd, Warden, 180 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1950).
18. This conclusion is strengthened by several recent Indiana Supreme Court decisions
stating that the highest court of Indiana will entertain a petition for a delayed appeal in
cases where state action has interfered with the timely perfection of an appeal or the
application for a new trial. Sweet v. State, 226 Ind. 566, "81 N.E.2d 697 (1948) ; State
ex rel. Walker v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 375, 75 N.E.2d 417 (1947); State ex rel. Barnes
v. Howard, 224 Ind. 107, 65 N.E.2d 55 (1945) ; State ex rel. Cook v. Howard, 223 Ind.
694, 64 N.E.2d 25 (1945). In addition to the Indiana Supreme Court's inherent powers
to hear a late appeal it has also a direct statutory grant of power for this purpose. IND.
STAT. ANN. § 9-3305 (Burns Repl. 1946).
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the ground that an adequate state remedy is still available. Balanced against
the increased complexity of state remedies, however, is the possibility that
by means of the delayed appeal the Indiana Supreme Court may succeed in
sidestepping technical procedural obstacles to its correction of errors occurring
in the state judicial process which have resulted in denial of constitutional
rights. The delayed appeal might possibly be extended even beyond its present
limits and afforded to petitioners who have failed to perfect their appeals
within the allowed period for reasons other than state interference where
there is a contention that fundamental rights have been violated. This view,
expressed by the dissenting opinion in Johns v. State,1 places the proper
emphasis on the responsibility of the state judiciary for insuring compliance
with federal constitutional guarantees in criminal proceedings in state courts.
The equal protection of the laws aspect of the Cook case may prove to be
of considerable significance in the future delineation of the scope of this
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals held (a) that
the petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws was invaded
by the action of state authorities subsequent to his conviction; and (b) that this
denial rendered his detention illegal, thereby entitling him to his freedom. The
validity of the petitioner' contention-that where the right to appeal is guaran-
teed by state law, state action preventing exercise of this right constitutes a
denial of equal protection which invalidates incarceration-was acknowledged.
The Seventh Circuit relied almost solely on Cochran v. Kansas,2 apparently
giving little independent consideration to the novelty of their conclusions.
Both propositions, it is true, gained at least nominal recognition from the
United States Supreme Court in the Cochran case in 1941. The facts there
were almost identical to those in the Cook case, except that in the former
it had not been previously established, as in the latter, that an attempt to
appeal actually had been obstructed. Cochran made the same two argu-
ments presently under discussion, the validity of which the respondent con-
ceded.2-  This concession was due to the fortuitous circumstance that the
. 19. 89 N.E.2d 281 (1949). In this case Johns failed to file a transcript of the record
in the office of the clerk within the time fixed by rule 2-40 of the supreme court rules.
Dismissal was based on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction because the
appeal had not been perfected within the required time. The dissent noted, however, that
".. . this court in recent years has in many instances properly refused to permit rules to
become the instrument of oppression. Where an accused has been deprived of his consti-
tutional rights, negligence of counsel cannot be permitted to prejudice such rights . . .
where . . . life or liberty are involved. This court has the power and it should be its duty
to waive any given rule where . . . an accused has been deprived of his constitutional
rights . . . under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ." 89 N.E.2d 281, 286 (1949). The
well-reasoned dissent took the position that since the question presented by Johns involved
his constitutional rights, a delayed appeal should have been allowed despite the fact that
failure to prosecute a timely appeal was in no way attributable to state action.
20. 316 U.S. 255 (1941).
21. Id. at 257.
NOTES
Kansas attorney general chose to base his objection to petitioner's discharge
on the contention that there actually had been no state action obstructing
the attempts to appeal. Thus it is evident that this concept-suppression
by state authorities of the right to appeal, where guaranteed by state law, is a
denial of equal protection-gained its first federal judicial recognition without
challenge.22 Moreover, the Supreme Court's acceptance of Cochran's argu-
ment that the denial of equal protection subsequent to a lawful conviction ren-
dered his detention illegal and entitled him to his release was based only on an
extremely liberal interpretation of the law of Kansas. 2s Consequently the Su-
preme Court's recognition of these two arguments in 1941 was at best indirect.
2 4
The equal protection clause has long occupied a subordinant role as a
device to protect individual rights against state usurpation.2 1 It has been
used by the courts chiefly as a basis for appraising legislative classification ;28
and it is mainly in this context that it has been utilized to protect the rights
of defendants in state criminal proceedings.27  In view of this background
22. "The state properly concedes that if the alleged facts pertaining to suppression
of Cochran's appeal were 'disclosed as being true before the supreme court of Kansas,
there would be no question but that there was a violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' And in Kansas, habeas corpus is recognized as affording
a remedy for a person held in prigon in violation of a right guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution." Id. at 257-258. This is the Court's only allusion to equal protection in
the Cochran case.
23. The Cochran case reached the Supreme Court on certiorari to the Supreme Court
of Kansas to review a denial of habeas corpus. Therefore, the law of Kansas governed
as to that state remedy. Re Jarvis, 66 Kan. 329, 71 Pac. 576 (1903), was cited to support
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of applicable Kansas law. That case
appears to hold only that an unconstitutional law is a nullity and that a conviction under it
is not merely erroneous but void and subject to collateral attack in a habeas corpus
proceeding.
24. There are numerous cases which indicate that due process of law may not compre-
hend the right to appeal. See, e.g., Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175, 176 (1946);
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627 (1937) ; Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S.
293, 297 (1895) ; Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895) ; McKane v. Durston, 153
U.S. 684, 688 (1893); Casebeer v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d 789, 790 (10th Cir. 1940); De
Maurez v. Swope, 104 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1939). It seems probable that counsel re-
sorted to the equal protection argument in the Cochran case only because, in view of these
precedents, he preferred to attempt to induce the Court to extend the scope of the equal
protection clause in support of his contention that his client's constitutional rights were
invaded. This is strongly suggested by Petitioner's Brief, p. 24, Cochran v. Kansas, 316
U.S. 255 (1941), in which counsel alludes to the cases supporting the proposition that due
process does not include the right to appeal, and then attempts to support the validity of
the equal protection argument while recognizing that it has never been previously invoked
in these circumstances.
25. "A construction of the equal protection clause which would find a violation of
federal rights in every departure by state officers from state law is not to be favored."
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11, 12 (1944).
26. Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rv.
341, 346 (1949).
27. The following cases hold criminal statutes unconstitutional denials of equal
protection because the classification was unreasonable: Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1941) ; McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1915) ; People v. Fitzgerald,
14 Cal. App.2d 180, 58 P.2d 718 (1936): Dowd, Warden v. Stuckey, 222 Ind. 100, 51
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it is admittedly somewhat surprising to see the clause used to prevent dis-
crimination by the states in the administration of their criminal procedures.
Nevertheless, the conclusion seems inescapable that if equal protection dic-
tates that state legislation must operate equally upon those in like circum-
stances, 28 it should also command that in the administration of this legislation
the state must not discriminate between those similarly situated. In no
area does this conclusion have greater validity than in that of determining
and meting out criminal penalties. Of course petitioner was not the only
one whose right to appeal was suppressed by the Indiana prison authorities.
This denial affected all inmates who lacked funds to hire counsel or friends
on the outside to file their appeal papers for them. But surely it can not
be contended, in answer to the proposed application of this new found device
to prevent state discrimination, that the fact petitioner was incarcerated and
unable to hire counsel is a reasonable basis for classification. This aspect
of the Circuit Court's decision was explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court. 9
It is with the second phase of the opinion of the lower court that the
Supreme Court took issue :"o
There remains the question of the disposition to be made of this case.
Fortunately, we are not confronted with the dilemma envisaged by
the State of having to choose between ordering an absolute discharge
of the prisoner and denying him all relief. The District Court has
power in a habeas corpus proceeding to "dispose of the matter as law
and justice require." 28 U. S. C. § 2243. The Fourteenth Amendment
precludes Indiana from keeping respondent imprisoned if it persists
in depriving him of the type of appeal generally afforded those con-
victed of crime. On the other hand, justice does not require Indiana
to discharge respondent if such an appeal is granted and reveals a trial
record free from error. Now that this Court has determined the
federal constitutional question, Indiana may find it possible to
provide the appellate review to which respondent is entitled.
N.E. 2d 947 (1943) ; Carson v. Baldwin, 236 Mo. 984, 144 S.W.2d 134 (1940) ; State v.
Gregori, 318 Mo. 998, 25 S.W.2d 747 (1928) ; People v. Simmons, 130 Misc. Rep. 821, 226
N.Y.S. 397 (1927) ; Head v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. Rep. 594, 183 S.W.2d 570 (1944) ;
Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341 (1937). Bit cf. Hale v. Common-
wealth of Ky., 303 U.S. 613 (1938), where the Supreme Court held that racial discrimina-
tion in the selection of grand jurors is prohibited by the equal protection clause; U.S.
ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, 52 F. Supp. 265 (N.D. Ill. 1943), where the court held that change
in length of petitioner's sentence by successor to parole board denied equal protection;
Blocker v. State, 112 Tex. Crim. Rep. 275, 16 S.W.2d 253 (1929), where prosecutor's
statement to jury that decedent slapped Negro defendant to keep him in his place and
that jury "need not be told what to do" held to violate equal protection. It will be noted
that in these cases in which equal protection was invoked for reasons other than un-
reasonable legislative classification either racial discrimination or unreasonableness of
classification by an administrative body was involved.
28. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1941); Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1927).
29. Dowd v. U.S. ex rel. Cook, 71 Sup. Ct. 262 (U.S. 1951).
30. Id. at 264.
NOTES
The Supreme Court's reluctance to sanction an unconditional discharge where
the deprivation of constitutional rights occurred subsequent to conviction, was
probably motivated to a large extent by its unwillingness to turn loose upon
society a man convicted of murder whose conviction has never been re-
pudiated.3 But the decision has the practical effect of an order to the
state to manufacture an adequate remedy or else. The Court made this dis-
position of the case with full awareness of the lower court's finding that
state remedies had been completely exhausted. Although couched in non-
mandatory language, it appears to be an unwarranted federal intervention
in a matter heretofore peculiarly within the realm of state powers. More-
over, it is difficult to justify the Court's casual assumption that a denial
of equal protection can be "cured" in this manner after an interval of seventeen
years during which the victim of the state's dereliction has been incarcerated.
The most inacceptable aspect of this decision is that while it recognized
that events subsequent to conviction may amount to denial of equal protection,
it proceeds to seriously impair the efficacy of this constitutional guarantee
by supplying a totally inadequate remedy. The states are merely put on
notice that they may continue to deny equal protection to those convicted of
crime subject only to the slight inconvenience of according the safeguards they
should have provided in the beginning if and when the denial is challenged.
The idea that a deprivation of equal protection subsequent to lawful
conviction renders the commitment void and entitles petitioner to release on
habeas corpus is not revolutionary. It apparently falls within the broad
language of several decisions expressing the view that any violation of con-
stitutional rights will be remedied in this manner.3 2  Also analogous to this
proposition rejected by the Court are two recent cases in the federal courts
which have held that subjecting a convict to cruel and unusual punishment
violated due process of law and that such violation, although subsequent to a
lawful conviction, justifies petitioner's discharge from custody.33
Cook was entitled to the timely review of alleged errors in the trial
court which is afforded under Indiana law to all those convicted of crime.3 4 ,
Action of state authorities deprived him of this right in derogation of the
31. In Brief for Petitioner, p. 17, Dowd, Warden v. U.S. ex rel. Cook, 180 F.2d 212
(7th Cir. 1950), the state forcefully presented this argument to the court.
32. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331, 332 (1914) ; Grahm v. Squier, 132 F.2d
681, 683 (9th Cir. 1942) ; Filer v. Steel, 228 Fed. 242, 245 (W.D. Pa. 1915).
33. Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Cal. 1950) ; Johnson v. Dye,
175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1950). Also, in
Boykin v. Huff, 121 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1941), petitioner claimed that his constitutional
rights had been violated by action of state authorities subsequent to conviction. The
court, while remanding the case to the state court, commented that if the consequences
of the state's mistake could not have been remedied in any other way, petitioner's claim
to freedom would have been entitled to serious consideration.
34. INn. STAT. ANN. § 9-2301 (Burns Repl. 1942).
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equal protection clause. It is well established that denial of constitutional
rights in the course of proceedings before conviction deprives the court of
jurisdiction and invalidates petitioner's detention. 5 It is unthinkable that
invasions of constitutional guarantees should remain unredressed merely be-
cause they occur subsequent to conviction. Before a petitioner can be heard in
habeas corpus proceedings in the federal courts, he must have thoroughly ex-
hausted his state remedies,38 unless there has been a determination by the
federal court that the state remedies are unavailable or inadequate under the
particular circumstances.3 7 Thus it is evident that the refusal of a federal court
to exercise its discretion 8 to discharge a petitioner so situated would leave
him without a practical remedy39 for the invasion of his constitutional rights
short of federal interference with matters of state procedure.
Two possible rationales have been suggested for the proposed result that
the denial of equal protection after conviction renders detention illegal and
enables petitioner to invoke the writ of habeas corpus :40 (a) the denial of
constitutional rights after conviction relates back to deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction ab initio; (b) judgment of conviction is not regarded as consti-
tutionally final until the time for appeal has passed, and unconstitutional inter-
ference with timely appeal prevents the conviction from ever becoming valid.
However, it would seem to be unnecessary to resort to any such fictional
rationale to support discharge on habeas corpus in the federal courts where
state remedies have been exhausted, as in the Cook case. Where constitutional
rights have been infringed at any stage in the state judicial process and the state
affords no possibility of redress, these facts alone should justify the vindication
of petitioner's rights by the only adequate means available to the federal courts."'
If it is essential that the Court adopt a different approach in this area
where petitioner claims that state action denying him recourse to a state crimi-
nal procedure violates equal protection than in those habeas corpus cases based
on an infringement of the more fundamental guarantees constituting due
process of law, surely a solution more acceptable than that adopted by the
35. Bowen v. Johnson, 306 U.S. 19 (1938) ; Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.
1945) ; Price v. Johnson, 125 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1942) ; Minnec v. Hudspeth, 123 F.2d
444 (10th Cir. 1941).
36. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950) ; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
37. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1947).
38. 62 STAT. 964, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 105 (1949):
"(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,
the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions ...
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless. . . . (3) He is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
39. The state action of which petitioner is complaining may give rise to a civil cause
of action. However, this remedy has consistently proven to be an inadequate protection
against overreaching acts of state authorities.
40. Petitioner's Brief, p. 36 n. 37, Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1941).
41. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
NOTES
Supreme Court can be devised. Extension of the equal protection clause
to inequality in the treatment of offenders after conviction is of slight
significance when limited by the unsatisfactory remedy supplied by the
Court. Admittedly it is altogether possible in the former situation that
the conviction was a just one, despite the deviation from established pro-
cedure; and violation of a technical right by the state should not be per-
mitted to result in petitioner's escape from just punishment.
Where the denial of constitutional rights is held to invalidate the convic-
tion, a release on habeas corpus does not bar the state from initiating a new
prosecution, this time complying with constitutional mandates.42 A more
desirable solution which might render absolute discharge a less drastic remedy
would require the federal courts to pursue a course similar to that followed
by the District Court for the Western District of Missouri in Honaker v. Cox.48
There the court found that the sentence under which petitioner was serving
was void because he had been insane when it was imposed, had n6t been
represented by counsel, and had not intelligently and competently waived the
right to counsel. However, the court also found that at the time of the
habeas corpus hearing petitioner was sane and therefore the District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky, in which petitioner had been sentenced,
had jurisdiction to entertain a new prosecution against him under the original
indictment. In pursuance of these findings the court ordered petitioner
discharged, subject to the condition that he be held for a reasonable time to
allow the authorities of the Eastern District of Kentucky to claim his custody
for the purpose of initiating a new proceeding against him. A procedure
such as this applied to situations where there is denial of equal protection by
state action would prevent the petitioner from leaving the jurisdiction be-
fore the state could begin possible new proceedings, and would perhaps
induce the federal courts to be more liberal in granting the remedy.44  A
similar disposition of the Cook case would have actually corrected the earlier
denial of equal protection in so far as it is within the power of the judiciary
to accomplish this end and at the same time would have protected the public
interest in the punishment of criminal offenders.
42. Murphy v. Mass., 177 U.S. 155 (1900) ; Bryant v. U.S., 214 Fed. 51 (8th Cir.
1914).
43. 51 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Mo. 1943).
44. 62 STAT. 965, 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1948). "Issuance of writ [of habeas corpus].
• . . The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter
as law and justice require." (Italics added.) This statute apparently authorized the
federal courts to exercise a wide range of discretion in shaping the remedy to fit the
particular circumstances in habeas corpus proceedings. It is not advocated that the dis-
charge should be conditional in every case where petitioner requests his discharge on
habeas corpus due to the violation of his right to equal protection. In instances where
the denial of constitutional rights was quite a substantial one or where the petitioner has
already served the major portion of his sentence, the analogy to the due process cases is
much stronger and it is only proper that the discharge should be absolute.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
It may be argued by analogy to the Cook case that in those areas where
the state has established substantial criminal safeguards higher than the mini-
mum requirements of due process, 45 the equal protection clause may be properly
invoked to prevent the states from discriminating in the administration of such
standards. True, this would extend the scope of equal protection considerably,
but once the rationale underlying the Circuit Court's decision in the Cook
case is accepted, it would be difficult to challenge such an extension.
The potential efficacy of the equal protection clause in this area is still
largely a matter for speculation. However, it is highly probable that the courts
will limit its application to those discriminations by the state which closely ap-
proximate the basic standards of justice comprising due process. Every devia-
tion by state authorities from formal criminal procedures in the course of
their judicial proceedings undoubtedly will not justify recourse to this con-
stitutional guarantee.
If a state has fully complied with the existing requirements of federal
due process, but has not afforded to the defendant all of the substantial rights
to which he is entitled under the state constitution or laws, invoking the equal
protection clause appears to be the only promising avenue of redress. The state
action obviously cannot be effectively challenged on the grounds of due process
without inducing the Supreme Court to expand that category of safeguards, a
step which the Court has on numerous occasions indicated reluctance to take.46
This fact indicates that in situations where there has been no direct holding by
the Supreme Court that the action complained of either does or does not violate
due process, but where it obviously fails to measure up to a state-established
standard, the equal protection argument again may be more expedient.
The right-to-counsel situation is one to which this newly established
federal device for enforcing non-discrimination by the states in the administra-
tion of their criminal procedures might well be successfully extended. It is
firmly established in Indiana that the state must provide counsel for indigent
defendants in all felony prosecutions unless the right to counsel is intelligently
waived.4 7  The federal standard of due process is less stringent. In Betts v.
45. The courts have frequently asserted that various state criminal safeguards are
not guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Adamson v. Cal., 332 U.S. 46 (1946) (exemption from self-incrimination); Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1941) (right to counsel in non-capital cases); Snyder v. Mass.,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933) (right to trial by jury) ; Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91
(1913) (right to preliminary hearing) ; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1883) (right
to indictment by grand jury) ; People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926) (right
not to be convicted by evidence secured by illegal search and seizure).
46. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946) ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1941) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) ; Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1883).
47. IND. CONST. ART. I, § 13. Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949);
Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 701, 125 N.E. 778 (1920). But see Schmittler v. State, 93
N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 1950). The right to counsel in Indiana is discussed in detail supra p. 234.
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Brady48 the Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not embody "an inexorable command that no trial for any offense or
in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is
not represented by counsel." Under the rule of that decision due process is
afforded to the defendant without supplying counsel for his defense when, in
view of all the surrounding circumstances, the denial of counsel does not
seriously prejudice his right to a fair hearing.49 If a case should arise in
which the state has fully complied with the federal standard as enunciated in
the Betts case, yet has failed to comply with its own more rigorous standard,
such a situation would provide an appropriate occasion to invoke the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.5  The previous ex-
tension of the clause to the analogous fact situation in the Cook case should
prove to be a persuasive factor in inducing the courts to take this step.
The application of the equal protection clause to defects occurring prior
to conviction, as in the right to counsel situation, would presumably not be
rendered impotent by restrictions on the remedy available in the federal
courts, since there can be no serious objection to invalidating a conviction
secured by denying equality of treatment.
THE GERRYMANDER AND JUDICIAL ABSTENTION-AN IM-
PORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLITICAL QUES-
TIONS AND THE DISCRETIONARY POWER TO
DENY EQUITABLE RELIEF
The right to effective participation in the selection of public officials is
fundamental to a truly democratic system.' Historically, however, various
political groups in the United States have succeeded in denying this right to
certain elements of the population. This end has been attained chiefly
48. 316 U.S. 455 (1941).
49. Id. at 473.
50. Todd v. State, 226 Ind. 496, 81 N.E.2d 530 (1948), is just such a case according to
the dissenting judges. See the dissenting opinions at 82 N.E.2d (1948) and 81 N.E.2d
784 (1948).
1. While this right is the foundation of our constitutional system it is qualified in
certain respects. The states have the right to define who shall participate by the exercise
of the franchise, U.S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 2, but their definition of the electorate must be
in compliance with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). Thus, as stated in Wiley v. Sinlder,
179 U.S. 58, 62 (1900), "The right to vote for members of the Congress of the United
States is not derived merely from the Constitution and laws of the State in which they
are chosen, but has its foundation in the Constitution of the United States." And when
the class who may vote has been defined by the state the members of the class must be
treated equally in their exercise of the right. Smith v. Allwright, supra. Generally, see
Note, Negro Disenfranchisement-A Challenge to the Constitution, 47 CoL. L. Rav. 76
(1947).
